The Infringement Notice System Under Hong Kong's Competition Law: Using the EU as a Benchmark

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Output Effect of Private Antitrust Enforcement

A growing body of literature evaluates the impact of antitrust laws on economic growth. Most of these empirical studies identify a positive impact; however, the existing literature only studies the effect of the existence of antitrust laws, but not their enforcement. To fill this gap in the literature, this Article uses private antitrust case filing numbers to examine the growth effect. Employing U.S. data and, after addressing endogeneity, using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression analysis, I identify a negative and robust association between private enforcement and output on a national level in the short run over the period from 1954 to 2019. However, I do not find a robust association between the two in the long run. In view of the results, I hypothesize a mechanism of an adverse effect of private antitrust enforcement on output in the short run

Incentivizing Private Antitrust Enforcement to Promote Leniency Applications: A Case Study of the United Kingdom [Article]

ArticleMany jurisdictions around the world are promoting private antitrust enforcement. However, currently, the dominant view is that private actions discourage leniency application, an important source for antitrust authorities to detect and combat cartels. Such a view hinders the development of private enforcement. In a separate theoretical work, based on a game theory model created by Professor Joseph E. Harrington, I discovered that private enforcement does not always have a negative impact on leniency application. Further, I argue that, instead, private enforcement, when used “properly,” could serve as a tool to promote leniency application. The current article offers a case study to support the theoretical work. To do so, I studied the 2014 Consumer Rights Bill in the U.K. which partly aimed at promoting private actions. Using Germany as the control group, I have conducted a difference-in-difference analysis and found around a 50% rise in leniency application in the U.K. following the introduction of said bill.This material published in Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law is made available by the James E. Rogers College of Law, the Daniel F. Cracchiolo Law Library, and the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact the AJICL Editorial Board at http://arizonajournal.org/contact-us/

Output Effect of Private Antitrust Enforcement

A growing body of literature evaluates the impact of antitrust laws on economic growth. Most of these empirical studies identify a positive impact; however, the existing literature only studies the effect of the existence of antitrust laws, but not their enforcement. To fill this gap in the literature, this Article uses private antitrust case filing numbers to examine the growth effect. Employing U.S. data and, after addressing endogeneity, using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression analysis, I identify a negative and robust association between private enforcement and output on a national level in the short run over the period from 1954 to 2019. However, I do not find a robust association between the two in the long run. In view of the results, I hypothesize a mechanism of an adverse effect of private antitrust enforcement on output in the short run